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Abstract. From 05.07 to 08.07.2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 Foun-
dations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware  was held in Schloss
Dagstuhl  Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several
participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open
problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the
seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together
in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in
general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if avail-
able.
Keywords. Foundations, PUF models, PUF applications, anti-counterfeiting,
forgery resilience, side-channel attack models
09282 Executive Summary  Foundations for Forgery -
Resilient Cryptographic Hardware
From July 5th, 2009 to July 8th, 2009, the Dagstuhl Seminar 09282 Foundations
for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware  was held in Schloss Dagstuhl 
Leibniz Center for Informatics.During the seminar, several participants presented
their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed.
The Executive Summary describes the goals of the seminar, the topics dis-
cussed and provides an overview of the program. The Executive Summary de-
scribes the seminar topics and goals in general. Abstracts of the presentations
given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are
put together in the Proceedings. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are
provided, if available.
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 09282
Foundations for Forgery-Resilient Cryptographic Hardware
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2407
2 Jorge Guajardo, Bart Preneel, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi and Pim Tuyls
Keywords: Foundations, forgery resilience, Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs), modeling, side-channel security models, PUF applications, hardware
Joint work of: Guajardo, Jorge; Preneel, Bart; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Tuyls,
Pim
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2408
Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption based on Physically
Unclonable Functions
Frederik Armknecht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
Physical attacks on cryptographic implementations and devices have become
crucial. In this context a recent line of research on a new class of side-channel
attacks, called memory attacks, has received increasingly more attention. These
attacks allow an adversary to measure a signiﬁcant fraction of secret key bits
directly from memory, independent of any computational side-channels.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) represent a promising new technol-
ogy that allows to store secrets in a tamper-evident and unclonable manner.
PUFs enjoy their security from physical structures at sub-micron level and are
very useful primitives to protect against memory attacks.
In this talk we present our ﬁrst steps towards combining and binding algorith-
mic properties of cryptographic schemes with physical structure of the underlying
hardware by means of PUFs. We introduce a new cryptographic primitive based
on PUFs, which we call PUF-PRFs. These primitives can be used as a source of
randomness like pseudorandom functions (PRFs). We construct a block cipher
based on PUF-PRFs that allows simultaneous protection against algorithmic
and physical attackers, in particular against memory attacks. While PUF-PRFs
in general diﬀer in some aspects from traditional PRFs, we show a concrete
instantiation based on established SRAM technology that closes these gaps.
Keywords: PRFs, PUFs, PUF-PRFs, memory leakage, SRAM PUFs, side-
channels, memory attacks
Joint work of: Armknecht, Frederik; Maes, Roel; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Sunar,
Berk; Tuyls, Pim
Security Challenges for RFID Systems
Lejla Batina (K.U. Leuven, BE)
In this talk we give an overview of security requirements for RFID systems
including scalability, anti-cloning and protection against tracking and imperson-
ation attacks.
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We also introduce our novel protocols for security: secure authentication pro-
tocols and a secure search protocol. In particular, we discuss several authentica-
tion protocols that are all made of the same building blocks but meet diﬀerent
security requirements. This feature allows for a simpliﬁed realization of the proto-
cols on a real tag. Our solutions rely exclusively on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC).
In addition, we present our work on an RFID chip with an Elliptic Curve
(EC) processor over GF (2163). The chip is fabricated in 0.13 um technology and
it shows the plausibility of meeting both security and eﬃciency requirements
even in a passive RFID tag.
Keywords: RFID security, authentication protocols, Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy
Joint work of: Batina, Lejla; Verbauwhede, Ingrid
Medical Applications of PUFs and Other Thoughts on
PUFs
Jorge Guajardo (Philips Research - Eindhoven, NL)
The ﬁrst part of this talk deals with how to make medical data submitted to
remote monitoring services more reliable. In particular, remote e-health services
are expected to signiﬁcantly expand in the near future. As a result a multitude
of vital body signs will be recorded at a remote location (e.g., at home) and
transmitted to a service provider for further processing and assessment. This
raises the need for technologies that will allow binding the identity of the person
to the measurement, as well as the the measurement to the device performing
the measurement. Such technologies would allow proving in an irrefutable man-
ner that a certain measurement corresponds to a particular patient (and not
someone else). Furthermore, it would allow healthcare providers to check from
which particular device the measurement originates. This supports information
reliability allowing healthcare providers to make clinical decisions based on mea-
surements collected by their patients remotely. In this paper, we describe how
to achieve this by combining ideas from physical unclonable functions (PUFs)
and template protection schemes for biometrics.
The second part of the talk discusses diﬀerent requirements and properties
that diﬀerent types of PUF and as a result the need for diﬀerent model capturing
these characteristics. In particular, we observe that the identiﬁcation properties
of PUFs that accept a small number of challenges such as SRAM PUFs and
Butterﬂy PUFs, should be modeled so as to capture variability among PUFs
instantiations on diﬀerent devices. Thus, in this case it only makes sense to talk
about variability and distribution of PUF outputs across diﬀerent devices. On
the other hand, for PUFs that do accept many (e.g. of the form 2l for l ≥ 50)
challenges, such as optical PUFs, one may talk of variability across diﬀerent
devices but also for diﬀerent challenges to a PUF on the same device.
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Keywords: PUFs, biometrics, remote health monitoring, authenticity, medical
applications, combined fuzzy extractors
Joint work of: Guajardo, Jorge; Asim, Muhammad; Petkovic, Milan
PUF-Based Authentication Protocols, Revisited
Stefan Katzenbeisser (TU Darmstadt, DE)
Classical authentication protocols, where one communication partner proves its
identity to another participant, are commonly based on cryptographic primi-
tives. Their security usually relies on a computationally hard problem. Most
constructions are based on the possession of a secret key, which is assumed not
to fall in the hands of an adversary. However, this assumption may be violated
if an adversary has physical access to the device that performs authentication
for a short time. In this period, the adversary may read the whole memory of
the device including all secret information, unless hardware security measures
are taken. With this information, the adversary can ﬁnally run an imperson-
ation attack. Such an attack is usually outside of the considered attacker model
in classical cryptography. However, in many practical authentication scenarios,
this attack is realistic. Consider for example a situation, where a waiter in a
restaurant carries a credit card away from the table for billing. During this short
time the card is not under full control of the owner and an adversary may read
the data of the card memory in order to extract the secret information. More-
over, the card reader is potentially under full control of the adversary. Thus,
data stored in the memory of the reader is potentially at risk as well.
Physical Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) were proposed as a building block
for authentication schemes that can resist physical attacks. PUFs are physical
objects which are unique and uncloneable. Technically speaking, a PUF responds
to a stimulus with a physical output (which can be measured and encoded as a
bit string) and has the following three properties: First, it is impossible to clone
a PUF even with highly complex equipment. Second, it is infeasible to predict
the output for a chosen stimulus without physically evaluating the PUF, and
third, the output looks random.
Several authors therefore proposed to use PUFs as basic primitives for con-
structing authentication and key agreement protocols, due to their uncloneability
and pseudo-random behavior. However, so far, there is still no acceptable secu-
rity model that allows to formally prove PUF-based protocols secure. In this
talk we give an overview of existing PUF deﬁnitions and discuss how they can
be extended to a theoretical model of security for PUF-based authentication.
Subsequently, we sketch a security problem present in existing authentication
protocols that use uncontrolled PUFs.
Keywords: PUF, authentication, security model
Joint work of: Katzenbeisser, Stefan; Busch, Heike; Rührmair, Ulrich
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Anti-Counterfeiting: Mixing the Physical and the Digital
World
Darko Kirovski (Microsoft Research - Redmond, US)
In this paper, we overview a set of desiderata for building digital anti-counterfeiting
technologies that rely upon the diﬃculty of manufacturing randomized complex
3D objects. Then, we observe how this set is addressed by RF-DNA, an anti-
counterfeiting technology recently proposed by DeJean and Kirovski. RF-DNA
constructs certiﬁcates of authenticity as random objects that exhibit substantial
uniqueness in the electromagnetic domain.
Keywords: Certiﬁcates of authenticity, RF-DNA, physically unique one-way
functions
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2406
GNSS Signal Authentication Methods
Markus Kuhn (University of Cambridge, GB)
In some security-critical applications for satellite-navigation receivers, those in
possession of the receiver may have an interest in it producing an incorrect
output: vehicle and container tracking, usage-based road charging, prisoner tag-
ging, location-based access control. This talk reports on the ongoing design of
a tamper-resistant GPS receiver architecture for such applications, with a par-
ticular focus on trust metrics that can be used to distinguish an authentic GPS
signal at the RF antenna port from one forged using a signal simulator.
Keywords: GPS, Galileo, tamper-resistant receiver, anti-spooﬁng, signal simu-
lator
Engineering On-Chip Thermal Eﬀects
Patrick Schaumont (Virginia Polytechnic Institute - Blacksburg, US)
Temperature eﬀects can be used to maliciously aﬀect the behavior of digital
crypto-circuits. For example, temperature eﬀects can create covert communica-
tion channels, and they can aﬀect the stability of physical unclonable functions
(PUFs). This talk observes that these thermal eﬀects can be engineered, and we
describe two techniques. The ﬁrst technique shows how to ﬁlter the information
through a covert temperature channel. This leads to detectors for very speciﬁc
events, for example, someone touching the chip package. The second technique
shows how to mitigate the impact of temperature on a PUF design while avoid-
ing costly post-processing. We discuss the design of a compact ring-oscillator
PUF for FPGA which is tolerant to temperature variations.
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Keywords: PUFs, temperature eﬀects, covert temperature channel, ring oscil-
lator PUF, FPGAs
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2403
An eﬃcient fuzzy extractor for limited noise
Boris kori¢ (TU Eindhoven, NL)
A fuzzy extractor is a security primitive that allows for reproducible extraction
of an almost uniform key from a non-uniform noisy source. We analyze a fuzzy
extractor scheme that uses universal hash functions for both information rec-
onciliation and privacy ampliﬁcation. This is a useful scheme when the number
of error patterns likely to occur is limited, regardless of the error probabilities.
We derive a sharp bound on the uniformity of the extracted key, making use
of the concatenation property of universal hash functions and a recent tight
formulation of the leftover hash lemma.
Keywords: Fuzzy Extractor, PUF, physical unclonable function, universal hash
Joint work of: kori¢, Boris; Tuyls, Pim
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2409
Full Paper:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/030
Simpliﬁcation of Controlled PUF primitives
Boris kori¢ (TU Eindhoven, NL)
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are physical objects that are unique, prac-
tically unclonable and that behave like a random function when subjected to
a challenge. Their use has been proposed for authentication tokens and anti-
counterfeiting. A Controlled PUF (CPUF) consists of a PUF and a control layer
that restricts a user's access to the PUF input and output. CPUFs can be used
for secure key storage, authentication, certiﬁed execution of programs, and cer-
tiﬁed measurements. In this paper we modify a number of protocols involving
CPUFs in order to improve their security. Our modiﬁcations mainly consist of
encryption of a larger portion of the message traﬃc, and additional restrictions
on the CPUF accessibility. We simplify the description of CPUF protocols by
using ﬂowchart notation. Furthermore we explicitly show how the helper data
for the PUFs is handled.
Keywords: PUF, physical unclonable function, controlled PUF, CPUF
Joint work of: kori¢, Boris; Makkes, Marc X.
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Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2404
Full Paper:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/328
Leakage Resilient Cryptography in Practice
Francois-Xavier Standaert (UC Louvain-la-Neuve, BE)
In this report, we are concerned with models to analyze the security of crypto-
graphic algorithms against side-channel attacks. Our objectives are threefold. In
a ﬁrst part of the paper, we aim to survey a number of well known intuitions
related to physical security and to connect them with more formal results in this
area.
For this purpose, we study the deﬁnition of leakage function introduced by
Micali and Reyzin in 2004 and its relation to practical power consumption traces.
Then, we discuss the non equivalence between the unpredictability and indistin-
guishability of pseudorandom generators in physically observable cryptography.
Eventually, we examine the assumption of bounded leakage per iteration that
has been used recently to prove the security of diﬀerent constructions against
side-channel attacks. We show that approximated leakage bounds can be ob-
tained using the framework for the analysis of side-channel key recovery attacks
published at Eurocrypt 2009.
In a second part of the paper, we aim to investigate two recent leakage re-
silient pseudorandom generators, both from a theoretical and practical point of
view. On the one hand, we consider a forward secure generator from ASIACCS
2008 and its similarities with a previous construction by Bellare and Yee. On the
other hand, we analyze Pietrzak's block cipher based construction from Euro-
crypt 2009. Doing this, we put forward the diﬃculty of meaningfully restricting
the physical leakages and show that this diﬃculty leads to diﬀerent drawbacks.
This allows us to emphasize the diﬀerences between these two designs. First, one
construction that we analyze requires strong black box assumptions (i.e. random
oracles) - the other one considers unrealistic leakages leading to (possibly useless)
performance overheads. Second, one construction considers an adversary able to
adaptively choose a leakage function while the second one does not permit this
adaptivity. Third, the security proof of the Eurocrypt 2009 construction relies on
the assumption that only computation leaks" (or relaxed but related hypothe-
ses) while this assumption is not necessary for the ASIACCS construction. We
then discuss the impact of these hypotheses with respect to recent technological
advances.
In the third part of the paper, we show that Pietrzak's leakage resilient
mode of operation from Eurocrypt 2009 can be broken with a standard DPA
if it is re-initialized without sharing new keys. Then, we propose solutions to
ﬁx this issue and extend the initial proposal from ASIACCS 2008 in order to
rely on more standard cryptographic constructions. We use these alternative de-
signs to illustrate the incompatibility between a fully adaptive selection of the
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leakage function and the secure initialization of a pseudorandom generator. We
also argue that simple pseudorandom functions (e.g. the one of Goldreich, Gold-
wasser, Micali) can be shown leakage resilient under certain black box assump-
tions (again, using the random oracle methodology). We additionally discuss the
security vs. performance trade-oﬀ that is inherent to these diﬀerent schemes and
the (im)possibility to obtain similar results with pseudorandom permutations
(e.g. the one of Luby, Rackoﬀ). Eventually, we show that the security of stan-
dard pseudorandom number generators against side-channel adversaries cannot
be directly generalized in the standard model. It is an open problem to determine
the minimum black box assumptions and restrictions of the leakage function that
would be required for this purpose.
Keywords: Side-channel attack security model, assumptions, bounded leakage,
leakage resilient PRNGs and modes of operation
Joint work of: Standaert, Francois-Xavier;Pereira, Olivier; Yu, Yu; Quisquater,
Jean-Jacques; Yung, Moti; Oswald, Elisabeth
Full Paper:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/341
Hardware Authentication Leveraging Performance Limits
in Detailed Simulations and Emulations
G. Edward Suh (Cornell University, US)
This talk will present a new approach to check the authenticity of hardware
based on the inevitable performance gap between real hardware and simulations
or emulations that impersonate it.
More speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that each processor design can be au-
thenticated by requiring a checksum incorporating internals of complex micro-
architectural mechanisms to be computed within a time limit; this checksum is
diﬀerent for each processor model and only authentic secure hardware can obtain
the checksum fast enough.
This new authentication approach provides potential solutions to privacy,
scaling, and security issues of traditional approaches that rely only on certiﬁcates.
Architectural simulations and an RTL implementation show that the pro-
posed approach is viable with very low hardware overheads.
See also: Dan Deng, Andrew H. Chan, G. Edward Suh, "Hardware Authentica-
tion Leveraging Performance Limits in Detailed Simulations and Emulations",
to appear in Proceedings of the 46th Design Automation Conference.
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Fingerprints from Optical Discs
Berk Sunar (Worcester Polytechnic Institute, US)
In this talk we outline a new technique for extracting unique ﬁngerprints from
identical CDs. The proposed technique takes advantage of manufacturing vari-
ability found in the length of the CD lands and pits. Although the variability
measured is on the order of 20 nm the technique does not require the use of mi-
croscopes or any advanced equipment. Instead, the electrical signal produced by
the photodetector inside the CD reader will be suﬃcient to measure the desired
variability. We provide empirical evidence obtained by analyzing 100 identical
CDs and show how to extract a unique ﬁngerprint for each CD. Furthermore,
we introduce a novel technique for utilizing fuzzy extractors over the Lee metric
without much change to the typical code oﬀset construction. With the aid of the
proposed fuzzy extractor we give speciﬁc parameters and code constructions to
convert the derived ﬁngerprints into 128-bit cryptographic keys.
Keywords: Discs, ﬁngerprinting, manufacturing variability, copy protection
Joint work of: Hammouri, Ghaith; Dana, Aykutlu
How to Make Smartcards Resistant to Hackers'
Lightsabers?
Philippe Teuwen (NXP Semiconductors - Leuven, BE)
Cracking smartcards has always been a prized hobby, for the academic glory , for
fun (ha, breaking the self-claimed unbreakable...) and for proﬁt (ask the maﬁa).
State-of-the-art techniques include laser blasts that inject various transient
or permanent faults in a program execution, potentially making the smartcard
do whatever the attacker wants.
After a brief recap of the attack tools and their eﬀects, we'll see how the pro-
grammer can protect his code with software techniques ranging from cookbook
recipes to tool chain automation and how he can evaluate the robustness of his
code by means of fault injection simulators.
Keywords: Fault-injection, smartcard, simulator
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2401
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Pim Tuyls (Intrinsic-ID - Mol, BE)
Counterfeiting of goods in general and of electronic goods in particular is a
growing problem with a huge impact on the global economy, the society and the
security of its critical infrastructure.
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Various examples are known where companies suﬀer from economic and
brand damage due to competition with counterfeit goods. In some cases the
use of counterfeit components has even led to tragic accidents in which people
are killed. Finally, it has been shown that counterfeit products can penetrate
the critical and security infrastructure of our modern societies and hence cause
a threat to the national security. One of the diﬃculties to deal with this problem
stems from the fact that counterfeit goods can originate from sources that are
able to make copies that are very hard to distinguish from their legitimate coun-
terpart. A ﬁrst well-known aspect of counterfeiting is product cloning. A second
much less known but increasingly dangerous aspect consists of over-production
of goods. In order to deal with these two aspects of counterfeiting a secret un-
clonable identiﬁer is required together with strong cryptographic protocols. In
this paper we focus on a new way to deal with these problems: Hardware Intrinsic
Security. It is based on the implementation and generation of secret physically
unclonable identiﬁers. Some important examples will be presented and their im-
plementation, reliability and security aspects are discussed.
Keywords: Counterfeiting of goods, product cloning, overproduction, Hardware
Intrinsic Security
Joint work of: Handschuh, Helena; Tuyls, Pim
Enhancing RFID Security and Privacy by Physically
Unclonable Functions
Christian Wachsmann (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
RFID-enabled systems allow fully automatic wireless identiﬁcation of objects
and are rapidly becoming a pervasive technology with various applications. How-
ever, despite their beneﬁts, RFID-based systems also pose challenging risks, in
particular concerning user privacy.
Indeed, improvident use of RFID can disclose sensitive information about
users allowing the creation of detailed user proﬁles. Hence, a careful analysis in
appropriate security and privacy models is needed before deployment to practice.
Moreover, most RFID chips are computational and memory constrained devices
without protection against physical tampering. Thus, existing, usually computa-
tionally demanding privacy-protecting schemes cannot be applied while physical
attacks that reveal the tag secrets impede the use of symmetric-key based tech-
niques. Hence, the design of a usable privacy-preserving RFID protocol currently
is a challenging open problem. In this context, Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUFs) provide cost-eﬃcient means to ﬁngerprint chips based on their physical
properties and can be used to realize tamper-evident storage for cryptographic
secrets.
Recently, Vaudenay presented a comprehensive RFID security and privacy
framework that captures authentication of tags to readers and anonymity aspects
(Vaudaney, 2007). This framework deﬁnes eight privacy notions that correspond
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to adversaries of diﬀerent strength, i.e., that diﬀer in their ability to access the
secrets of (i.e., to corrupt) tags and to obtain auxiliary information from tag to
reader communication.
We will present an eﬃcient privacy-preserving PUF-based RFID protocol
that addresses Vaudenay's open question on the feasibility of destructive privacy,
i.e., privacy of tags that are destroyed during corruption. This means that our
protocol provides untraceability of tags against adversaries that permanently
destroy a tag by physically attacking (i.e., corrupting) it. It is based on the weak
private protocol proposed in (Vaudenay, 2007) and uses Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) as tamper-evident key storage in a similar way as described in
(Tuyls, P. and Batina, L., 2006). This means that the tag authentication key is
not stored on the tag but reconstructed from the physical characteristics of the
RFID chip each time it is needed. The properties of the PUF ensure that any
attempt to physically tamper with the PUF to obtain the authentication secret
of the tag result in destruction of the PUF and the tag secret, which corresponds
to the deﬁnition of a destructive adversary in the security and privacy model of
(Vaudenay, 2007).
Keywords: PUFs, RFID, chip ﬁngerprinting, privacy preserving authentication
RFID protocols
Joint work of: Wachsmann, Christian; Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Visconti, Ivan
